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ILLINOIS V. GATES:
A PARADOXICAL VERSION OF "COMMON SENSE"
INTRODUCTION
Each year law enforcement officers submit thousands of applications for search warrants to magistrates. Many of the affidavits submitted in support of these applications contain facts not
directly known to the officer-affiants, but learned by them
through informants' tips. In determining whether probable cause
exists for a warrant to issue in such cases, magistrates may be
required to evaluate hearsay information.
In considering informants' tips, magistrates and reviewing
courts have applied a two part test first developed by the Supreme
Court in Aguilar v. Texas' and refined shortly thereafter in United States v. Spinelli.2 The "Aguilar-Spinellitwo-prong test" has
been guiding courts for over a decade, and has generated a substantial body of case law.
In June, 1983, the Supreme Court announced in Illinois v.
Gates3 that it was abandonning the two-prong test, substituting
in its place a "totality of the circumstances analysis." 4 Illinois v.
Gates is the most recent in a long line of cases in which the
Supreme Court has struggled with the knotty problem of hearsay
in the context of probable cause. 5 In breaking with Spinelli and
its progeny, the Gates decision raises troubling questions for
reviewing courts, magistrates, and law enforcement officials,
and serves to highlight once again the difficulties inherent in
hearsay issues.

1. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
2. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
3. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
4. Id. at 2332.
5. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560
(1971); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102
(1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528
(1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960);
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480
(1958); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Nathanson v. United States, 290
U.S. 41 (1933).
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This note explores the dimensions of Illinois v. Gates. It begins
with a brief discussion of the problem of hearsay in a probable
cause context. It then provides a summary of Aguilar and Spinelli and a third key Supreme Court decision, Draper v. United
States.6 The note briefly considers the effect these three decisions have had on the lower courts and on the legal literature of
which the Gates majority is particularly critical. Next, the Gates
decision itself is examined, and finally, an analysis of the majority opinion is offered.
HEARSAY IN A PROBABLE CAUSE CONTEXT

Hearsay Generally
The problem of hearsay has been analyzed most thoroughly in
the context of in-court testimony. 7 In a trial situation, the finder
of fact makes inferences based on the testimony of the witness
before him or her. Upon closer examination, this commonsensical, intuitive process can be broken down into two simple
questions: First, does this witness really believe what he or she is
telling me and, second, if so, does his or her belief reflect reality?8
These two questions may be phrased in different ways, but
they remain logically necessary elements in evaluating testimony. 9 Answering both questions is often difficult, but when the
witness is in front of the trier of fact, the trier can observe him or
her directly and benefit from responses given under crossexamination. The task is rendered far more difficult when the
trier of fact is called upon to consider hearsay evidence. 10 Not
only must the finder of fact judge the veracity and the basis of
knowledge of the witness who is relating the out-of-court state-

6. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
7. See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 579-756 (2d ed. 1972); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE chs. 45-50 (3d ed. 1940); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the
Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948).
8. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 350 (2d ed. 1982).
9. One commentator, for example, has shown the mental process by means of a triangle, representing a "'trip' into the head of... the declarant... and a trip out .. , in order
to match the declarant's assumed belief with the external reality sought to be demonstrated." Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay,87 HARv. L. REV. 957,959 (1974).
10. "Hearsay" is defined in the Federal Rules of Evidence as "a statement, other than

one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
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ment, but he or she must also judge the veracity and basis of
knowledge of the original declarant who cannot be observed or
questioned. Courts generally have preferred hearsay to no evidence at all, provided that attendant circumstances minimize
one or more of the dangers commonly associated with it." The
complex set of standards for governing the admission of hearsay
at trial 12 reflects the historical search for specific indicia of
reliability.13

Hearsay in a ProbableCause Determination
At a probable cause hearing, hearsay is most often presented
in the form of tips provided to the police by informants, frequently members of the underworld who receive favors for their
services.'4 Although problems of hearsay arise at probable cause
hearings just as they would in a trial setting, the intricate hearsay rules and exceptions used for trials are out of place in less
formal probable cause proceedings. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized the differences between the amount and
modes of proof involved in proving guilt in a criminal case ver15
sus showing probable cause for an arrest or search warrant.
The Court has resisted the introduction of rules of evidence in
probable cause hearings, eschewing the technical requirements
of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law plead6

ings.1

Nevertheless, some minimal criteria for evidence in probable
cause determinations are imposed by the fourth amendment. The
fourth amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and requires that "no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by an oath or affirmation, and partic-

11. The dangers most commonly associated with hearsay are ambiguity, insincerity,
erroneous memory, and faulty perception. See G. ILIx, AN LNTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 159 (1978); Tribe, supra note 9,at 957.
12. In the United States the use of hearsay in criminals trials has also been affected
by the sixth amendment right to confrontation. See, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719
(1968); Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh
Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99 (1972).
13. The Federal Rules of Evidence offer a codified version of hearsay exceptions, See
FED. R. EVID. 803, 804 and advisory committee notes.
14. M. HARNEY & J. CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 1968); 1 W.
LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 499 (1978).
15. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949). See also infra note 89.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). See also infra note 89.
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ularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized."' 17 The Court has read the fourth amendment
to require that a warrant be issued only by a neutral and detached magistrate, 8 based on facts or circumstances from which
he or she can draw his or her own independent conclusion. 19
In Nathanson v. United States,20 the Court first held that
merely conclusory statements, even when made by a trusted law
enforcement officer under oath, would not support a finding of
probable cause.2 ' Nathansonmade it clear that even in the relative informality of a probable cause hearing, where most rules of
evidence do not apply, the magistrate must still grapple with the
two fundamental questions faced by a jury at trial. The magistrate must first assess the credibility of those who furnish information and then weigh the sufficiency of the factual basis for
the information. 22 Nathanson dealt with direct testimony of an
officer-affiant, not with hearsay. It would seem to follow from
Nathanson, however, that the logic which governs the evaluation of information from the primary source should also govern
the evaluation of information from a secondary source, such as
an informant's tip.23 In considering whether a tip provides probable cause, it would seem that not only must the magistrate
decide that the officer-affiant is telling the truth and that the
officer-affiant's conclusions reflect reality, but the magistrate
must also conclude that the absent, non-swearing informant was
also telling the truth and that the informant's conclusions
reflected reality. In Aguilar v. Texas, 24 decided some thirty years
later, the Supreme Court explicitly adopted this corollary of
Nathanson.

17.
18.
19.
20.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41,46 (1933).
Id.

21. Id. at 47. In Nathanson, an officer stated in a sworn affidavit that he had "cause
to suspect and [did] believe" that contraband was on certain premises. Id. at 44. The
Court held the affidavit insufficent because "it went upon a mere affirmation of suspicion
and belief without any statement of adequate supporting facts." Id. at 46. Although
Nathanson did not involve hearsay evidence, the principle it established was incorporated into subsequent decisions on informants' tips.
22. Moylan, Hearsay and ProbableCause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer,25 MERCER
L. REv. 741, 743 (1974).
23. Id. at 750.
24. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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THE AGUILAR-SPINELLI TwO-PRONG TEST AND
DRAPER V. UNITED STATES

In Aguilar v. Texas, 25 the Supreme Court laid down a two part
standard to be used in evaluating hearsay in a probable cause
context 26 that set forth the criteria to be used in evaluating
informants' tips, i.e., independent facts that suggest, first, the
informant's basis of knowledge and, second, his or her personal
veracity. 27 Questions remained, however, as to just what kinds
of evidence would satisfy the new criteria. The Supreme Court

25. Id.
26. In Aguilar, the affidavit submitted by police in support of their application for a
warrant stated:
Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do
believe that heroin, marijuana, barbituates and other narcotics and narcotic
paraphenalia are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose of
sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law.
Id. at 109. The Court concluded that the affidavit failed to inform the magistrate why the
informer was credible or how he obtained his information, and hence could not support a
finding of probable cause.
Aguilar was not the first Supreme Court decision to deal with probable cause and
informants' tips. One major decision antedating Aguilar by four years was Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Jones was given renewed vitality in Illinois v. Gates. See
infra note 113.
In Jones, the affidavit submitted in support of a request for a search warrant stated
that the affiant-detective had "received information" from "persons familiar" to him who
had "admitted to the use of narcotic drugs and display needle marks as evidence of
same," and who had "given information ... on previous occasions and which was correct." 362 U.S. at 267-68. The tip related that defendant and another "kept a ready supply
of heroin on hand. . . either on their person, under a pillow, on a dresser or on a window
ledge in [their] apartment," and that the informant had "on many occasions . .. gone to
said apartment and purchased.., drugs." Id. The affidavit also stated that "this same
information, regarding the illicit narcotic traffic .... has been given to ... [affiant] and to
other officers ... by other sources of information." Id. The Court upheld the warrant. It
held that an affidavit is not to be deemed insufficient by virtue of the fact that it set out
not the affiant's observations but those of another, "so long as a substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay is present." Id. at 269. The Court specifically observed that the
informant had previously given accurate information, his story had been corroborated by
other sources of information, and he was known by police to be a user of narcotics. Id. at
271. "Corroboration," explained the Court, "reduced the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale." Id.
Since the affidavit in Jones would have satisifed the Aguilar-Spinelli two-prong test,
the "substantial basis" standard in Jones is generally read as the inchoate source of
Aguilar. Moylan, supra note 22, at 781-82. Some courts, however, have viewed the "substantial basis" standard as a distinct alternative to the two-prong test. Id. The State of
Illinois advanced this latter theory both in the lower courts and before the Supreme Court
in Illinois v. Gates. Ultimately, the Gates Court appeared to have adopted a version of
the latter position. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
27. 378 U.S. at 114-15.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 15

had already struggled with some of these evidentiary questions
in pre-Aguilar decisions, 28 most notably, Draper u. United States.29 Draper explored the weight and relevance to be given to
independent police investigation that corroborated the detail in
an informant's tip. This was an issue that came back to haunt
the Court in later decisions, culminating in Illinois v. Gates. As a
key to understanding Gates, Draper ranks in importance with
Aguilar and Spinelli.
In Draper, a paid informant who had given police accurate
information on past occasions provided a tip that Draper would
be returning by train from Chicago to Denver at a specified time
with three ounces of heroin. The tip contained a wealth of detail,
including a complete description of Draper's appearance and the
clothes he would be wearing. 30 At the specified time, Draper
alighted from the train, dressed as predicted, and was arrested
by detectives who had staked out the train station. They had
independently verified every detail in the tip except whether
Draper was, in fact, carrying heroin. The Court held that, even
without confirmation of this final and crucial fact, the detectives
had probable cause for an arrest. Because every other bit of
detail in the tip had been personally verified, the Court found
reasonable grounds to believe that the remaining, unverified bit
of information that Draper had heroin on his person would also
31
be true.
Draper is intuitively appealing, but logically troubling. Certainly the corroboration of details in a tip provides a magistrate
with an independent basis for finding those details to be true.
The crucial detail, however, was left unverified. Draper's possession of heroin could have been pure invention by the tipster, or
the tipster could have drawn a mistaken conclusion based on

28. See supra notes 5 and 26.
29. 358 U.S. 307 (1959). No affidavit was in question in Draperbecause the arrest was
made by an officer without a warrant. The issue was strictly whether the arresting detective had probable cause, and the inquiry thus focused on the knowledge of the detective,
not, as is more common, that of the magistrate.
30. The tip stated that the suspect had gone to Chicago by train the day before, and
would be bringing back three ounces of heroin either the next morning or the morning
thereafter. The informant described the suspect as a light-complected black man, 27 years
old, 5'8" tall, and weighing 120 pounds. The suspect would be wearing a light raincoat,
brown slacks and black shoes, and would be carrying a tan zipper bag and walk "real
fast." Id. at 309.
31. Id. at 313.
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Draper's reputation, or erroneously relied on a casual underworld

rumor. 32 Nevertheless, the Draper Court held that a magistrate
would be justified in inferring the truth of the final fact.
The evidentiary issues in Draper were thrown into sharper
relief when Aguilar announced the two-prong test four years
later. To remain viable after Aguilar, Draper and its facts would
have to satisfy the two prongs. The Court, in Spinelli v. United
States,33 reaffirmed the two-prong test of Aguilar and the continued vitality of Draper. In doing so, the Spinelli Court laid
down some rudimentary guidelines for the kinds of evidence that
could satisfy each prong. A two step analysis was recommended.
First, a magistrate was to consider whether the informant's tip,
standing alone, satisifed Aguilar's two prongs. A tip that stated
that the informant gained his or her information from first-hand
observation, for example, would readily meet the basis of knowledge prong of the Aguilar test.3 4 The second prong, dealing with
the informant's honesty, could be satisfied by a statement in the

32. This objection was raised in part by Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion, id. at 324
(Douglas, J., dissenting), and later by Justice White in his concurring opinion in Spinelli
v. United States, 393 U.S. at 426-27 (White, J., concurring).
33. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The affidavit in Spinelli related the substance of the tip as
follows:
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been informed by a confidential, reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting
wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of telephones which
have been assigned the numbers of WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136.
Id. at 422.
The Court held that, standing alone, the informant's tip could not be credited by a
magistrate "without abdicating his constitutional function." Id. at 416. The affiant
offered no reason why the informant was reliable, nor did the affiant present any of the
underlying circumstances which led the informant himself to conclude that Spinelli was
a bookmaker.
The Court then turned to other pieces of information in the affidavit to determine
whether there was sufficient independent corroboration to cure the defects in the tip, and
thus satisfy Aguilar. The affidavit related: (1) FBI observations of Spinelli driving from
Illinois to St. Louis, parking his car and entering an apartment there; (2) a telephone
company verification that the two phones in the apartment carried the numbers mentioned in the informant's tip; and (3) Spinelli's reputation among law enforcement officials as a bookmaker. The Court called the third allegation a "bald and unilluminating
assertion of suspicion," and gave it no weight. Id. at 413-14. The first two allegations
suffered from another infirmity: they reflected only innocent-seeming activity and data.
Id. The Court concluded that the corroborating information was too weak to cure the
defects in the tip itself, and hence, the Aguilar criteria were not met.
The question of corroboration of seemingly innocent activity arose again in Illinois v.
Gates, but there the Court took a very different position. See infra note 110.

34. LaFave, Probable Cause from Informants: The Effects of Murphy's Law on
FourthAmendment Adjudication, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 36 (1977).
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affidavit that police officers had, on previous occasions, received
35
accurate tips from the informant.
If, however, the tip, standing alone, could not satisfy both
prongs, then Spinelli directed the magistrate to turn to other
facts in the affidavit, and assess whether they supported an
inference as to the informant's basis of knowledge or credibility.
Spinelli specified two factors that warranted inferences that each
of Aguilar's prongs had been satisifed, each drawn directly from
the facts of Draper. First, when there is no past record of an
informant's truthfulness, independent police corroboration of
some or all of the informant's tale may satisfy the magistrate
that the informant is telling the truth at least on this particular
occasion.36 Spinelli pointed to Draper as a relevant comparison
for the level of police verification needed.3 7 Second, when there is
no direct assertion that the informant obtained his or her story
from first-hand observation, a sufficient factual basis for the tip
could nonetheless be inferred by the magistrate if the level of
detail in the tip was so rich that the informant had to be relying
on more than a casual underworld rumor or the suspect's general
reputation. 38 Again, the Spinelli Court drew on Draperas a suit39
able benchmark for the requisite amount of detail.
This dual reliance on Draperunfortunately compounded rather
than solved the problem of how to justify the inferential leap
from fully corroborated details in a tip to the truth of the uncorroborated, often-times crucial facts alleged. 40 Perhaps the simplest way for the Court to have settled the issue would have been
to reassert that a finding of probable cause did not require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. 41 The Court might have held that, in
weighing the facts in a particular warrant application, a magistrate may gauge the probability of the required inferences, and
that one of the factors to consider is the amount of detail in the
tip weighted by the degree to which it has been independently
verified.
If this was, in fact, the message of Spinelli, it was unfortunately obscured by the language of the opinion. Spinelli did

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 10.
393 U.S. at 417.
Id.
Id. at 416.
Id.
Moylan, supra note 22, at 775.
See supranote 15 and accompanying text.
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explicitly approve of the use of police corroboration to infer that
the informant was not lying,12 but the Court said nothing concerning how such corroboration might relate to an inference that
the informant had a solid basis for his knowledge for the tip.
Instead, Spinelli emphasized the level of detail in the tip in its
explanation of how the Draper facts satisfied this prong. 43 The
Court's reasoning left many with the impression that it was not
police corroboration, but "self-verifying detail" that satisfied the
44
basis of knowledge prong of Aguilar.
If this reading of Spinelli is correct, the opinion takes on a
puzzling asymmetry. It has been observed that the use of "selfverifying detail" to infer a basis of knowledge appears forced
and artificial compared to the practicality and common sense of
using police corroboration to infer an informant's credibility. 45 If
corroboration can support a conclusion that the tipster was not
lying about unverified facts, why can it not support a conclusion
that the tipster was likewise not mistaken or relying on an
underworld rumor? Some commentators have suggested that
Spinelli in effect "rewrote" Draperto make it conform to the twoprong test by inventing the level-of-detail inference. 46
In sum, Spinelli illuminated some aspects of hearsay in a
probable cause context, while obscuring others. It represented a
step toward a coherent treatment of informants' tips, but it fell
short of being a fully formed, systematic analytical framework. 4 7 Unhappily, the lower courts appear to have overlooked
42. 393 U.S. at 417.
43. Id. at 416-47.
44. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 34, at 42-44; Moylan, supra note 22, at 775-77.
45. LaFave, supra note 34, at 43-44; Note, The Informer's Tip as Probable Cause for
Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 958, 966 (1969).
46. LaFave notes that Draper itself was not decided on the basis of "self-verifying
detail," but "was 'rewritten' in a sense" by Spinelli. LaFave, supra note 34, at 8, 50 n.244.
Justice White, concurring in Spinelli, also pointed out that Draper was not decided on a
self-verifying detail theory, but on the basis of corroboration of the tip. 393 U.S. at 426-27.
(White, J., concurring).
47. The Spinelli holding was, of course, shaped by the facts in that case. The rule
fashioned by the Court was broad enough to cover only the evidence presented in that
specific affidavit. The catalogue of evidence potentially useful in meeting Aguilar's two
prongs, however, is far more extensive. For example, an informant's veracity might be
inferrable if the tip was in the form of a dying declaration or a spontaneous excited
utterance. The only concrete step taken by the Supreme Court in the direction of supplementing Spinelli's evidentiary rule was in United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971). In
that case, the Court added another basis for satisfying the veracity prong: when a tip
contains a statement against the informer's penal interest. "Admissions of crime, like
admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibility." Id. at
583. Other than Harris, there has been very little judicial expansion of the range of
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the half-finished character of Spinelli, and have come instead to
view it as the outer limit of permissible inference rather than a
starting point.48 As a consequence, the ambivalence in Draper

and Spinelli concerning partial corroboration of detailed tips has
been reflected rather than resolved in subsequent judicial
opinions.4 9
THE PROGENY OF AGUILAR, SPINELLI, AND DRAPER

Given that the relevant Supreme Court decisions cannot be
completely rationalized or reconciled,5 0 it is not surprising that
the lower courts have had difficulty in applying the two-prong
test.5 Another source of unnecessary confusion has been the
courts' ambiguous use of the word "reliable."5 2 A third problem,
it has been suggested, lies "not with Aguilar or Spinelli as opin5 3
ions, but with the elusive nature of the hearsay problem, itself."
One notable exception to the general disorder in the lower
courts has been the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. In a
series of some fourteen decisions,5 4 Judge Charles E. Moylan
has attempted to impose some rigor into the use of hearsay in
the context of probable cause. Of these, Stanley v. State5 5 stands
as the seminal interpretation of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Draper,Aguilar, and Spinelli.
Adopting virtually all of the reasoning in Stanley, Professor
Wayne R. LaFave has subsequently built on Judge Moylan's
acceptable evidence from which inferences may be drawn.
48. See, e.g., infra note 69 and accompanying text.
49. LaFave, supra note 34, at 60-67.
50. Id. at 2-3.
51. Id.
52. Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 524, 313 A.2d 847, 857 (1974); Moylan, supra
note 22, at 754-55.
53. Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. at 555, 313 A.2d at 859-60; Moylan, supra note 22, at
786.
54. Shoemaker v. State, 52 Md. App. 463,451 A.2d 127 (1982); Ehrlich v. State, 42 Md.
App. 730, 403 A.2d 371 (1979); Sewell v. State, 34 Md. App. 691, 368 A.2d 1111 (1977);
Andresen v. State, 24 Md. App. 128, 331 A.2d 78 (1975), aff'd. 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Everhart v. State, 20 Md. App. 71, 315 A.2d 80 (1974); Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 313
A.2d 846 (1974); Schmidt v. State, 17 Md. App. 492, 302 A.2d 714 (1973); Hignut v. State,
17 Md. App. 399, 303 A.2d 173 (1973); Soles v. State, 16 Md. App. 656, 299 A.2d 502 (1973);
Thompson v. State, 16 Md. App. 546, 298 A.2d 458 (1973); King v. State, 16 Md. App. 546,
298 A.2d 446 (1973); Dawson v. State, 14 Md. App. 18, 284 A.2d 861 (1971); Dawson v.
State, 11 Md. App. 694, 276 A.2d 680 (1971).
55. 19 Md. App. 508, 313 A.2d 846 (1974). Judge Moylan took much of the text in his
article verbatim from his opinion in Stanley. See Moylan, supra note 22. This note will
cite identical passages to both sources.
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work. 56 Taken together, the writings of Moylan and LaFave
have offered a coherent, systematic treatment of hearsay in a
probable cause context that has had considerable influence on
lower courts throughout the United States. Courts in no fewer
than twenty-three states, fifteen of which are the highest courts
in these states, have cited with approval or quoted extensively
from Moylan or LaFave or both.57 Several federal courts, including four circuit courts, have also relied on one or both authorities.5 8 The prominance of the Moylan-LaFave approach in the
jurisprudence of probable cause and informants' tips is perhaps
best illustrated by the fact that the Supreme Court singled out
59
Stanley v. State for special criticism in Illinois v. Gates.
Relating the Two-Prong Test to the Logic of Hearsay
The key contribution of Moylan and LaFave was to help lower
courts, magistrates, and law enforcement officials draw the
parallel between the two-prong test and the basic inferential process underlying all hearsay evaluations. 60 The practical effect of
the analysis shared by Moylan and LaFave has been to remove
the two-prong test from the realm of judicial fiat to the field of
common sense.

56.See generally W. LAFAVE. LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT (1978); LaFave, supra note 34.
57. Illustrative decisions by state supreme courts which have recognized Moylan or
LaFave are: Waldrop v. State, 424 So. 2d 1349 (Ala. 1982); People v. Kurland, 28 Cal. 3d
384, 168 Cal. Rptr. 667, 618 P.2d 218 (1980); People v. Montoya, 189 Colo. 106, 538 P.2d
1332 (1975); State v. Decano, 60 Hawaii 205, 588 P.2d 909 (1978); State v. Gomez, 101
Idaho 802, 623 P.2d 114 (1981); People v. Gates, 85 111. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981), rev'd
sub nom. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983); State v. Buckley, 426 So. 2d 108 (La.
1983); People v. Walker, 401 Mich. 572, 259 N.W.2d 1 (1977); State v. Hawkins, 278 N.W.2d
750 (Minn. 1979); People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594, 416 N.E.2d 1015, 434 N.Y.S.2d 679
(1980); State v. Schmeets, 278 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1979); State v. Montigue, 288 Or. 359, 605
P.2d 656 (1980); State v. Rigsbee, 89 S.D. 360, 233 N.W.2d 312 (1975); State v. Barrett, 132
Vt. 369, 320 A.2d 621 (1974); State v. Lair, 95 Wash. 2d 706, 630 P.2d 427 (1981).
Decisions by appellate courts in other states are: State v. Watkins, 122 Ariz. 12, 592 P.2d
1278 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Barfield v. State, 413 So. 2d 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Shaner v.
State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 340 (1980); Whirley v. State, 408 N.E.2d 629 (Ind. App.
1980); State v. Davis, 8 Kan. App. 2d 39, 649 P.2d 409 (1982); Commonwealth v. Chatman,
275 Pa. Super. 5,418 A.2d 582 (1980); Winkles v. State, 634 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
58. United States v. Bruner, 657 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Bush, 647
F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Colon, 559 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Button, 653 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Stevens, 543 F. Supp. 929
(N.D. 111.1982); United States v. Ward, 546 F. Supp. 300 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
59. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
60. Moylan, supra note 22, at 743, 750-51.
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The first step was to coin a more precise vocabulary than that
used in Aguilar or Spinelli.61 This vocabulary operates in context as follows: The absent informer who provided the tip has,
unlike the officer requesting a warrant, taken no oath. Hence,
the magistrate must have a reason to be persuaded of the informant's truthfulness. This is the "veracity prong." 62 The affidavit
must show either the inherent credibility of the informant (the
"credibility spur") or some other circumstances reasonably assuring the reliability of the information on the particular occasion
of its being furnished (the "reliability spur").63 The second prong
concerns the magistrate's determination of how the informant
has come to know what he or she states is true. The magistrate
must still be persuaded that the informant has not made an
error, albeit an honest one. This is the "basis of knowledge"
64
prong.
The Moylan-LaFave approach emphasizes that the two prongs
of Aguilar and Spinelli are completely independent.65 Because
the questions posed in the two prongs are analytically severable,
"'overkill' on one prong will not carry over to make up for a
deficit on the other prong." 66 In this respect, Judge Moylan's
analysis comports with the common sense of hearsay inference
and reflects the entire line of Supreme Court cases from Nathanson to Spinelli.
Judge Moylan's analysis is distinguished by his reading of
Draper and Spinelli and the evidentiary rules he derives from
them. Judge Moylan reads Spinelli as prescribing two distinct
evidentiary "cures" for two very different types of "ailments" in
an informant's tip. 67 Corroboration, according to Moylan, may
be used to satisfy the veracity prong of Aguilar, and self-verifying
detail may be used to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong. He
adamantly maintains, however, that each of the two Spinelli
61. Stanley, 19 Md. App. at 524, 313 A.2d at 857; Moylan, supra note 22, at 754.
62. Stanley, 19 Md. App. at 525, 313 A.2d at 858; Moylan, supra note 22, at 751.
63. Stanley, 19 Md. App. at 526, 313 A.2d at 858; Moylan, supra note 22, at 755.
64. Moylan, supra note 22, at 751.
65. Alluding to the meaning of Nathanson v. United States, Moylan declared that
"[e]ven assuming credibility amounting to sainthood, the judge still may not accept the

bare conclusion of a sworn and known and trusted police afflant." If a trusted police
officer's own statement must be rejected for want of a basis for his or her knowledge,
there is even more reason to reject the bald assertion of an informant, no matter how
honest he or she might be. Stanley, 19 Md. App. at 530, 313 A.2d at 861; Moylan, supra
note 22, at 773.
66. Stanley, 19 Md. App. at 530, 313 A.2d at 861; Moylan, supra note 22, at 781.
67. Stanley, 19 Md. App. at 531,313A.2d at 861; Moylan, supra note 22, at 774.
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"remedies" is logically relevant only to its own prong, and is not
68
transferable to the other.
Judge Moylan's efforts have been ambitious on two fronts.
First, he has attempted to relate what he knows about the inferential process of evaluating hearsay to the Nathanson-Spinelli
line of decisions. Second, he has tried to reconcile all of the decisions themselves to reflect a consistent approach to probable
cause and informants' tips. He has met complete success in
neither task, however. Perhaps his difficulty has stemmed from
an acceptance of the Spinelli decision as a more comprehensive
statement of the evidentiary rules for hearsay in a probable
cause context than it actually was.69 Judge Moylan seems to
have created his system within the confines of Spinelli instead of
expanding upon it. His approach may be internally consistent,
but it has begun to an extent to resemble some of the elaborate,
intricate hearsay rules that the Court in Nathanson v. United
States 70 specifically found inappropriate for probable cause
determinations. The rigid, air-tight compartments into which
Judge Moylan believes evidence has to be segregated may, perhaps, result from respecting not the spirit, but what he reads to
be the letterof Draper,Aguilar, and Spinelli.
Despite these shortcomings, Stanley v. State and LaFave's
complementary writings have provided the lower courts with an
easily applicable, sometimes almost mechanical formula for evaluating informants' tips. The "hornbook" cogency of the MoylanLaFave approach has offered a welcome alternative to some of
the more opaque pronouncements of the Supreme Court. After
decades of ambiguity, there appeared to be emerging a more logical, common-sense structuring of probable cause congruent with
the underlying inferential process. Granted, there has remained
the task of clarifying the role of police corroboration of tips,
along with a number of other evidentiary questions, 71 but the

68. Stanley, 19 Md. App. at 523, 313 A.2d at 857; Moylan, supra note 22, at 774, 779.
Judge Moylan stands on solid logical ground in arguing that the level of detail in a tip
shows nothing about an informant's veracity. A skilled liar can easily fabricate a complicated story. The second side of Moylan's argument, however, falters. It is not at all
obvious why police corroboration of a detailed tip is irrelevant to the informant's basis of
knowledge. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 47. But see also infra note 71.
70. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
71. Moylan and LaFave themselves identified several unsettled questions within the
Aguilar-Spinelli framework to which the lower courts have provided sometimes conflict-
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basic conceptual framework seemed in place. The stage seemed
to be set for the Supreme Court to work out these issues in the
proper perspective. Significant progress appeared to have been
made doctrinal paths which, it was hoped, would lead to a
sound, coherent, and consistent body of jurisprudence. 72 It was
within this intellectual context that Illinois v. Gates was decided.
ILLINOIS V. GATES
Facts

On May 5, 1978, at about 4:00 p.m., Lance Gates, a resident of
Bloomingdale, Illinois, boarded Eastern Airlines flight 245 at
O'Hare Airport, departing for Palm Beach, Florida. Upon arrival, he took a taxi to the nearby Holiday Inn, and went to a
room registered in the name of Susan Gates. The next morning,
at 7:00 a.m., Gates left the motel with a woman in an automobile
bearing Illinois license plates, and started northbound on the
73
interstate highway.
These facts, seemingly innocent enough standing alone, had a
suspicious character for the various law enforcement officials
who were observing them. The Gates had become a subject of
interest for the Bloomingdale police department three days earlier, when an anonymous, handwritten letter had been delivered
in the mail. The letter stated that the Gates were drug smugglers,
describing in detail their modus operandi and predicting that
their next attempt would occur on May 3.74

ing answers. LaFave has focused on five questions: (1) What type of showing as to an
informant's track record will establish his or her credibility (e.g., information leading to
arrests or convictions)? (2) When is information from a paid underworld informant
genuinely against his or her penal interest? (3) How is the informant's basis of knowledge established in situations where, e.g., he or she claims to have seen cocaine sold?
How does he or she know it was cocaine? (4) How much detail must a "self-verifying" tip
contain? Must the facts detailed be incriminating? (5) Can police corroboration of a tip be
used to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong, as well as the veracity prong? Must the
facts corroborated be incriminating? LaFave, supra note 34, at 9-10, passim.
Judge Moylan has emphasized the issue of the citizen-informant, as opposed to the
"typical paid informant drawn from criminal milieu," and queried whether a more
lenient standard would satisfy the veractiy prong. Moylan, supra note 22, at 768-72.
72. LaFave, supra note 34, at 3.
73. 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (1983).
74. The full text of the anonymous letter is as follows:
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who strictly
make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on
Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most of their buys are
done in Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to
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The police set forth the results of their surveillance in an affidavit, attached a copy of the letter, and requested a judge of the
Circuit Court of DuPage County to issue a search warrant for the
Gates' car and home. The judge found that probable cause
existed, and issued the warrant. When the Gates returned to
their home in Bloomingdale at 5:15 a.m., twenty-two hours after
leaving Palm Beach, the police were waiting for them. A search
uncovered some 350 pounds of marijuana in the trunk of the car,
guns, other contraband, and more marijuana inside the house.7 5
The Illinois Courts' Decisions
The Gates were prosecuted in the Circuit Court of DuPage
County, Illinois, on various narcotics and firearms charges.
They moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search on the
ground that the warrant failed to comply with the AguilarSpinelli two-prong test. The court granted the motion, and the
state appealed.
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, 76 in an opinion that is a
classic application of the analysis in Stanley v. State.7 7 The
appellate court reasoned that, since the police obviously could
not know the identity of the anonymous letter writer, the basis of
his or her knowledge would have to be inferred. Under Spinelli, a
magistrate could infer a reliable source for the informant's tip if
there was enough detail to make it self-verifying. The court used
the facts in Draper as a standard for the level of detail required,
and found that the anonymous letter fell short. 78 Because the tip
be loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys [sic] down and drives it back. Sue flys
back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there
again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At the time

Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with over $100,000.00 in
drugs. Presently they have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire
living on pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They are
friends with some big drug dealers, who visit their house often.
Lance and Susan Gates
Greenway
in Condominiums.
Id. at 2325.
75. Id. at 2326.
76. People v. Gates, 82 Ill. App. 3d 749, 403 N.E.2d 77 (1980).
77. The Illinois Appellate Court quoted passages from Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508,
313 A.2d 847 (1974), and LaFave, supra note 34.
78. 82 Ill. App. 3d at 754, 403 N.E.2d at 81.
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failed to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong, the court never
reached a decision as to whether it satisifed the veracity prong.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
appellate court.7 9 Like the court below, the Illinois Supreme
Court used a Moylan-LaFave analysis. It agreed that the level of
80 Unlike the
detail in the letter was insufficient under Draper.
court below, however, the Illinois Supreme Court went on to
address the state's argument that because the detail, such as it
was, was corroborated to such a degree, probable cause did, in
fact, exist. In effect, the state asked the court to answer the question posed in Draper and left unanswered in Spinelli, i.e., when,
if ever, could a magistrate infer from corroboration of details in a
tip that an informant had an adequate basis for his or her
81
knowledge?
The Illinois Supreme Court cited both LaFave and Stanley v.
State for the proposition that corroboration could be used only to
support an inference of an informant's credibility.8 2 The court
also noted that the lower courts in the United States were not in
agreement on this point. 83 Although the Illinois Supreme Court
set the stage for deciding whether partial corroboration, combined with detail in a tip, could satisfy either prong of Aguilar, it
ultimately reserved the question. It reasoned that in the instant
case, corroboration was of innocent activity only, and this was
not enough. 84 Consequently, no probable cause existed to search
the Gates' house or car.
The United States Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider how the
fourth amendment applied to search warrants issued on the
85
basis of a partially corroborated anonymous informant's tip.

Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the five member majority, Justice White concurring in the judgment in a separate opinion, and Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissenting in

79. People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981).
80. Id. at 389, 423 N.E.2d at 892-93.
81. Id. at 386, 423 N.E.2d at 891.
82. Id. at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. The case was briefed and argued before the United States Supreme Court on
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two separate opinions. The Supreme Court reversed the Illinois
high court, holding that the judge issuing the warrant to search
the Gates' car and home had a "substantial basis" for finding
probable cause.8 6 The majority agreed to abandon the two-prong
test and "reaffirm the totality of the circumstances analysis that
87
has traditionally informed probable cause determinations."
A central theme running through the Court's opinion was that
probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard.8 8 The
majority opinion drew heavily from language in earlier opinions
to emphasize the fluidity of probable cause.8 9 The Court identified as perhaps the central teaching of these decisions that probable cause is a practical, non-technical concept. 90 Because the
probabilities in each factual context are different, the Court reasoned, the issuance of warrants could not be reduced to a "neat

October 13, 1982. At that time, however, the Court requested the parties to address an
additional question:
Whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); should to any extent be modified, so
as, for example, not to require exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable
belief that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.
103 S. Ct. at 2317 (quoting Order of November 29, 1982, 103 S. Ct. 436). Accordingly, the
parties briefed the new issue as requested, and the case was reargued on March 1,1983. The
Court handed down its decision on June 8,1983, declining, "with apologies to all," to address
the question of modifying the exclusionary rule. 103 S. Ct. at 2321. The Court explained its
reticence in a lengthy discussion which is beyond the scope of this note.
86. 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2336 (1983).
87. Id. at 2332.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2328. The Court relied particularly upon two of its earlier opinions, Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) and United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
Brinegardid not involve an informant's tip. Nevertheless, it articulated the basic guidelines for probable cause determinations that the Court followed in subsequent decisions
in which informants' tips were involved. Brinegar emphasized "the difference between
what is required to prove guilt in a criminal case and what is required to show probable
cause for arrest or search . . . (and the) difference in the quanta and modes of proof
required to establish them." 338 U.S. at 173.
The second case on which the Gates Court depended was United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102 (1965), decided nine months after Aguilar. It reversed as unduly technical
and restrictive a lower court's invalidation of a search warrant on the ground that the
affidavit had not stated in so many words that information was based upon the personal
knowledge of the affiant or other reliable investigators. Id. at 111. The Supreme Court
reaffirmed the Aguilar criteria, but indicated the spirit in which they were to be applied,
stating that "[aiffidavits for search warrants.... must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion." Id. at 108.
90. 103 S. Ct. at 2328 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 178(1949)).

170
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set of legal rules," such as those that had developed from Aguilar
and Spinelli.9' The Court stated that "the totality of the circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment
of probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific 'tests'
be satisfied by every informant's tip."92
Although the Court stated that it was "abandoning" the twoprong test of Aguilar and Spinelli,93 it never actually overruled
the holdings in either case. The Court explicitly reserved the
question of whether the affidavit invalidated in Spinelli would
support a finding of probable cause under the newly announced
totality of the circumstances test.94 In addition, though describing Aguilar as "the source of the two-pronged test,"95 the Court
appears to have attempted a rehabilitation of that decision, 96 recommending its facts as illustrative of the limits beyond which a
magistrate should not venture in issuing a warrant. 97
The Court seemed to reserve its strongest criticism not for its
own prior decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli, but for "the elaborate set of legal rules that have developed among the various
lower courts." 98 Numerous references in the opinion leave the
impression that the majority was at least as critical, if not more
so, of Spinelli's progeny as it was of Spinelli itself.99 Exem-

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2332.
94. Id. at 2332 n.11.
95. Id. at 2334.
96. "Our original phrasing.., in Aguilar suggests that the two prongs were intended
simply as guides to a magistrate's determination of probable cause, not as inflexible,
independent requirements applicable in every case... [W]e intended neither a rigid compartmentalization of the inquiries... nor that those inquiries be elaborate exegeses of an
informant's tip. Rather, we required only that some facts bearing on two particular issues
be provided to the magistrate." Id. at 2328 n.6 (emphasis in original).
As the only dissenter in Spinelli who was still on the bench, Justice Stewart must have
taken satisfaction in joining in the Gates majority's interpretation of Aguilar.Justice Black,
dissenting in Spinelli, had written, "this Court's decision in Aguilar... was bad enough ....
But not content with this, the Court today expands Aguilar to almost unbelievable proportions." 393 U.S. at 429 (Black, J., dissenting).
97. 103 S. Ct. at 2328 n.6.
98. Id. at 2327.
99. Examples include the following allusions:
"The Illinois Supreme Court, like some others, apparently understood Spinelli as
requiring..." Id. at 2326-27 (emphasis added).
"an elaborate set of legal rules that have developed among variouslocal courts to
enforce
the 'two-pronged test'..."Id. at 2327 (emphasis added).
"the entirely independent character that the Spinelli prongs have assumed... "Id. at 2328
n.5 (emphasis added).
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plifying the overly technical approach in the lower courts, according to the Court, was Stanley v. State.10 0 The majority singled
out Stanley for criticism in three extensive footnotes 1°' and, in
the text of the opinion, disparaged Judge Moylan's articulation
of the two-prong test.10 2 The conclusion thus appears virtually
inescapable that the majority was deliberately and unequivocally rejecting the conceptual framework that had become the
basis for probable cause determinations in many, if not most,
03
states, under Spinelli.
It is also worth noting what the Court was not rejecting. The
majority did not discount the relevance of the informant's verac-

"the 'two-pronged test' has encouraged..." Id. at 2330 (emphasis added).
"the direction taken by decisions following Spinelli..." Id. at 2331.
"an elaborate body of case law dealing with... the Spinelli test..." Id. at 2333.
"the type of 'reliability' or 'veracity' necessary to satisfy some views of... Spinelli..." Id.
at 2335.
"we reject the rigid categorization suggested by some of [Spinelli's]language." Id. at 2332
n.11 (emphasis added).
"The Aguilar-Spinelliformulation has provoked apparently ceaseless litigation." Id.
"The strictures that inevitablyaccompany the 'two-prongedtest'... "Id. at 2331 (emphasis
added).
"the rigorous inquiry into the Spinelli prongs and the complex super-structure of evidentiary and analytical rules that some have seen implicitin our Spinelli decision..." Id. at 2330
(emphasis added).
100. Id. at 2327 n.4.
101. Id. at 2327 n.4, 2328 n.5, 2329 n.8. The Court also briefly discussed three other
lower court decisions that had invalidatedinformants' tips. Id. at 2330 n.9. In Stanley, by
contrast, the tip had been found acceptable. Based on this, and the extensive attention
that the reasoning in Stanley received, it is apparent that the case was indeed singled
out.
102. Referring to "an elaborate body of case law dealing with the 'veracity' prong of
the Spinelli test, which in turn is broken down into two 'spurs'-the informant's 'credibility' and the 'reliability' of his information, together with the 'basis of knowledge' prong of
the Spinelli test," the Court found it "hard to imagine [that] such a labyrinthine body of
judicial refinement bears any relationship to familiar notions of probable cause." Id. at 2333.
103. It is questionable whether the Rehnquist majority would have been forced to
disavow Spinelli if the Moylan-LaFave approach had not developed. Certainly, the Court
would have been freer to construe the somewhat opaque language of Spinelli if it had not
already been subjected to such rigorous logical analysis. (The Court did recognize that
Stanley v. State was "conscientiously attempting to apply the 'two-pronged test.' " Id. at
2327 n.4.) In Ventresca, see supra note 89, the Court was able to uphold Aguilar
while refuting a lower court's interpretation. The Court simply delivered a stern lecture
on respecting the spirit rather than the letter of the two-prong test. Perhaps the MoylanLaFave approach had become too firmly entrenched to sever it from Spinelli in a similar
manner. Or perhaps the Court looked upon Spinelli as a "many-headed hydra"; where
the Stanley interpretation had been lopped off, three more versions, even more troublesome, might appear.
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ity or of his or her basis of knowledge in a probable cause determination. The Court viewed them as "highly relevant" elements
which "usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question
whether there is 'probable cause." ' 104 In fact, the Court intimated that veracity and basis of knowledge, now stripped of
their status as prongs, nevertheless must enter into a magistrate's
05
finding.'
The crucial issue on which the Gates Court departed from Spinelli and its predecessors was whether the (now defunct) prongs
were analytically independent. The Court rejected the concept
that an informant's believability, on the one hand, and his or
her basis of knowledge, on the other, should be understood as
entirely independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every
case.106 Instead, under the new totality of the circumstances
analysis, what were formerly prongs were now to be "closely
intertwined issues," 10 7 such that "a deficiency in one may be
compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip,
by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of
8
reliability."10

104. 103 S. Ct. at 2328.
105. Id. at 2332.
106. Id. at 2327-29.
107. Id. at 2328.
108. The Court offered two illustrations of situations in which a showing of an informant's veracity could compensate for inadequate information concerning the basis of
knowledge. The first was based on United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court derived from that case the proposition that when an informant is
known for unusual reliability to predict local crimes, his or her failure in a particular case
to set forth thoroughly the basis of knowledge should not be an absolute bar to a finding
of probable cause. 103 S. Ct. at 2329. The Court's attempt to state a general rule based on
Sellers is problematic, however, because the fa,-ts of Sellers were truly unusual. The
informant had given accurate tips in more than 100 cases, but on the particular occasion
in question, the affidavit omitted the source of his information. The court of appeals said
that the case was "both a unique and a close one" in upholding the warrant. 483 F.2d at
41. Professor LaFave discusses Sellers as an "exception to the general rule that the presentation of the informer's track record does not show his basis of knowledge," and considers the case "unique." LaFave, supra note 34, at 22-23.
The Court drew its second example from one of its own decisions, Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143 (1972). From this case, the Court generated the proposition that no scrutiny
of an "unquestionably honest" citizen's basis of knowledge for a report of criminal activity should be required, when criminal sanctions exist for fabrication. 103 S. Ct. at 2329.
Like its use of Sellers, the Court's use of Williams is open to criticism. The informant's tip
in Williams triggered a "stop and frisk," not an arrest or search. Hence, it was not necessary that the tip provide probable cause. An arrest did follow the frisk, but it was based
not on the tip, but on the suspect's illegal possession of a handgun, found during the
frisk. Professor LaFave has noted that the finding of probable cause in Williams, though
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The first step in applying the new totality of the circumstances
analysis to the facts in Gates was to consider the tip, standing
alone. As did the Illinois courts below, the Supreme Court held
that the anonymous letter, by itself, did not support a probable
cause finding. Significantly, the language used by the Court
closely tracked that in Aguilar.0 9
Second, the Court investigated whether the accompanying
affidavit could supplement the anonymous letter by the independent corroboration of the tip or by the amount of detail in the
tip.110 At this point, one may wonder how the totality of the circumstances analysis as applied by the Court in Gates differs
from the discredited two-prong test. The answer appears to lie in
the conclusions drawn from the evidence presented. The Court

"stimulated" by the tip, was made "entirely apart from the informant's communication."
LaFave, supra note 34, at 63-64. The Williams Court itself appeared to understand this
distinction when it stated:
[Wihile the Court's decisions indicate that this informant's unverified tip may
have been insufficient for a narcotics arrest or search warrant, [here the Court
cited Aguilar and Spinelli] the information carried enough indicia of reliability
to justify the officer's forcible stop of Williams.
407 U.S. at 147. (Ironically, it was Justice Rehnquist who wrote this passage.).
The third example offered by the Gates Court was intended to illustrate how a strong
showing of the informant's basis of knowledge could make up for a weak showing of the
informant's veracity. The somewhat obscurely worded hypothetical stated:
[E ]ven if we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and
detailed description of alleged wrong-doing, along with a statement that the
event was observed first-hand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might
otherwise be the case.
103 S. Ct. at 2329-30.
109. 103 S. Ct. at 2326. Cf. 378 U.S. at 114-15 for the parallel language used in Aguilar.
110. This step also parallelled the second step in the Spinelli analysis.
On the question of corroboration, the Court said:
The corroboration of the letter's predictions that the Gates' car would be in
Florida, that Lance Gates would fly to Florida in the next day or so, and that he
would drive the car north to Blomingdale, all indicated, albeit not with certainty, that the informant's other assumptions were also true.. -including the
claim regarding the Gates' illegal activity.
103 S. Ct. at 2335.
The Court was not troubled that the police had verified only innocent activity. It said:
[P]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal
activity, not an actual showing of such activity. By hypothesis, therefore, innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause.
...In making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not
whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but the degree of suspicion
that attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts.
Id. at 2335 n.13. The Court used Draperas precedent, where "seemingly innocent activity
became suspicious in light of the initial tip." Id.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 15

suggested that under the two-prong test, the detail in the letter
might well not permit an inference as to the informant's basis of
knowledge, since the detail was too scant."' Likewise, the independent police corroboration of the Gates' activity predicted in
the letter might not be extensive enough to satisfy the veracity
prong of Spinelli.112
Nevertheless, the Court found a sufficient basis for probable
cause under its totality of the circumstances test. The corroboration of details was enough for a practical, common-sense judgment.11 3 In reaching its conclusion, the Court returned to Draper
v. United States, referring to it as the "classic case" on corroboration.11 4 The Gates Court reread Draper without considering
Spinelli's intervening interpretation of it. The simple holding in
Draper was merely that probable cause existed in that case by
virtue of the independent corroboration of details in the tip."15
The Gates majority now asserted that Draperhad not, in fact,
satisifed the two prongs of Aguilar because the informant had
not really indicated the basis of his knowledge of Draper's possession of drugs. 116 Nevertheless, the totality of the circumstan7
ces in Draperprovided probable cause for arrest."
The Court found the facts of Draper directly controlling in
Gates. The level of detail in the anonymous letter sent to the
Bloomingdale police might not have been enough to satisfy Spi-

On the amount of detail in the letter, the Court said:
[Tihe anonymous letter contained a range of details relating not just to easily
obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future action
of third parties not easily predicted. The letter's accurate information as to the
travel plans of each of the Gates was of a character likely obtained from the
Gates themselves, or from someone familiar with their not entirely ordinary
travel plans. If the informant had access to accurate information of this type a
magistrate could properly conclude that it was not unlikely that he also had
access to reliable information of the Gates' alleged illegal activities.
Id. at 2335.
111. Id. at 2335-36.
112. Id. at 2335.
113. The Gates Court resurrected the "substantial basis" language of Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), in validating the warrant. 103 S. Ct. at 2336. Jones is discussed at supra note 26.
114. 103 S. Ct. at 2334.
115. The Court's reading of Draperturned it back into a corroboration-only case, discarding the self-verifying detail factor that the Spinelli Court later read into Draper.If, in
fact, Draper was rewritten by the Spinelli Court, as LaFave has suggested, then Gates
restored Draperto its original meaning.
116. 103 S. Ct. at 2334.
117. Id.at 2336.
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nelli's basis of knowledge prong, but such a stringent test was no
longer to be applied. All that was required was the probabilty
that the tipster had obtained his or her story from the Gates or
someone whom they trusted, "and corroboration of the letter's
predictions provides just this probability.""' 8 Here, at the conclusion of its opinion, the Court finally applied the totality of the
circumstances analysis. The Court held that corroboration, under
Spinelli apparently relevant only to an informant's veracity,
could now be used to compensate for a lack of evidence explaining how the informant knew what he or she knew.' 19 It is important to note that the Court did not hold that under certain circumstances the same evidence could be used to support each of
two independent, analytically severable prongs. The Court did
assert that when one of the now defunct prongs was satisfied by
ample evidence, it could compensate for an evidentiary deficit in
the other prong. Whether the detail in the anonymous letter and
the police corroboration of the Gates' travels were mutually reinforcing, or whether the corroboration merely bolstered a lack of
detail in the letter, the net effect was the same. The Court treated
the criteria of veracity and basis of knowledge as closely intertwined issues rather than discrete tests. The totality of the circumstances analysis in Gates was concerned not with subtotals,
as it were, of key categories in the probable cause accounting
ledger, but with the bottom line.
THE IMPACT OF ILLINOIS V. GATES

Stare Decisis
The reasoning of the five Justices who subscribed to the majority opinion raises some puzzling questions. From the standpoint
of legal precedent, the most enigmatic question is why the majority felt constrained to abandon Aguilar and Spinelli when it
could have found the warrant valid within the two-prong framework.

118. Id.
119. It is less clear whether the detail in the letter was, in turn, used to bolster the
inference as to the informant's veracity. Although the Court suggested that the police
corroboration might not satisfy the Spinelli veracity prong, it also appeared to conclude
that the corroboration did satisfy Draper's and Jones' "substantial basis" standard,
before any mention was made of detail in the letter. Id. at 2334.
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The Court had before it in Gates an excellent opportunity to
finally clarify how the facts in Drapersatisfied the two prongs of
Aguilar, an opportunity that the Court never fully exploited in
Spinelli. In particular, the Court could have held that corroboration of a detailed tip not only permitted an inference of an
informant's credibility, but also of his or her basis of knowledge.
All that would have been required to reach this result would
120
have been a clarification of the reasoning in Spinelli.
Much of the majority opinion does, in fact, lay the groundwork
for such a holding. The Court's emphasis on the fluid, nontechnical nature of probable cause, for example, speaks directly
to the logical problem of leaping from corroborated to uncorroborated facts in a tip. Likewise, when the Court expressed its dissatisfaction with the overly rigid evidentiary rules embodied in
Stanley v. State, its reasoning paved the way for correcting what
had become a common misreading of Spinelli. Rather than
merely overruling by implication the lower courts' widespread
misinterpretation of Draperand Spinelli, however, the Supreme
Court rejected two of its own pivotal opinions.
Justice White, in his concurring opinion, discussed in detail
how the Court could have upheld the search warrant in Gates
without sacrificing the two-prong test. He simply acknowledged
that partial corroboration of details in a tip could, under the
proper circumstances, satisfy both prongs of Aguilar and Spinelli.121 While cautioning against indiscriminate inferences from
police corroboration, Justice White asserted that corroboration of
extensive detail did make it sufficiently probable that a tip was
grounded on inside information, as in Draper."The rules would
indeed be strange," he commented, "if... the basis of knowledge
prong could be satisfied by detail in the tip alone, but not by

120. See supra note 103.
121. First, Justice White agreed with the majority that corroboration need not be of
incriminating details in the tip. 103 S. Ct. at 2348 (White, J., concurring). Then he

addressed the relevance of corroboration as evidence of an informant's basis of knowledge. He was careful to set the record straight on his view of how corroborating evidence
could be used. He noted that some commentators, and even Justice Brennan, had erroneously interpreted his Spinelli concurrence as espousing the view that corroboration could
satisfy only the veracity prong. Justice White clarified his position: "I did not say that
corroboration could never satisfy the basis of knowledge prong." Id. at 2349 n.22 (White,

J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Rather, he had merely expressed caution lest corroboration be used in this way in instances where it did not suggest that the informant
actually had an acceptable source for his or her information. Id. (White, J., concurring).
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independent police work."' 122 Justice White viewed the corroborated details in the anonymous letter in Gates sufficient to make
it probable that, not only was the letter writer credible, but he or
she had obtained the information in a reliable way.1 23 With Justice White's rationale so clearly argued, it is curious that he was
unable to win the votes of the four Justices who ultimately joined
Justice Rehnquist's opinion.
Gates and the Neutral MagistrateRequirement
Not only was the rejection of the two-prong test needless, at
least from the perspective of legal precedent, but it also raised a
serious fourth amendment question. Since the Court's seminal
decision in Nathanson v. United Sates, 124 courts have been
guided by the principle that probable cause must be based on an
independent assessment of the facts by a neutral and detached
magistrate. The unsupported conclusory statements of even the
most trustworthy officer cannot support probable cause. As Justice White had observed, concurring in Spinelli,125 it would be
"quixotic," then, if any less were required of an informant. In
Gates, Justice White voiced the same concern. Once the independence of the prongs has been broken down, presumably an
evidentiary "overkill" as to an informant's veracity could compensate for a serious lack of information as to the informant's
basis of knowledge. 26 Justice White offered, perhaps too gently,
that, to the extent the majority opinion could be read as an
implicit rejection of Nathanson, "the Court may not intend so
drastic a result."' 127
Gates and the Logic of Hearsay
The third and perhaps most serious problem is that Gates'
rejection of Spinelli's two-prong test is inconsistent with the
underlying inferential process of evaluating hearsay. As the
Gates Court itself admits, veracity and basis of knowledge are
122. Id. (White, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 2349 (White, J., concurring).
124. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
125. 393 U.S. at 424 (White, J., concurring).
126. The two examples offered by the majority, note 108 supra, certainly suggest as
much. So does the Court's quoting with disapproval Judge Moylan's often cited "sainthood" remark. 103 S. Ct. at 2329 n.8. See supra note 65.
127. 103 S.Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring).
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"highly relevant,"' 128 and should be included in a magistrate's
determination. What the Court apparently believes, however, is
that a magistrate can reach a final judgment by obtaining a
satisfactory answer to only one, not both, of the following questions: first, whether the speaker really believes what he or she is
telling me, and second, whether his or her belief reflects reality.
To so hold is to ignore the very common sense that the Court
was so zealously attempting to foster in Gates. The totality of the
circumstances test, despite the Court's rhetoric, obscures rather
than clarifies the necessary hearsay analysis. In pointing to the
pre-Aguilarprecedents as appropriate examples of probable cause
analysis, the Court put magistrates and reviewing courts in a
worse position than they were before the two-prong test. Because
the predecessors to Aguilar and Spinelli may no longer be read
as unarticulated two-prong analyses, they must now be read as
something else. The lower courts must turn once again to the
facts of earlier cases such as Draper, factor in the situation in
Gates, and try to determine how a totality of the circumstances
analysis is to be applied on a day-to-day basis. Just as Judge
Moylan did with Spinelli, the lower courts will attempt to derive
new rules to explain the factual relationships in those cases that
the Court still upholds. As the chameleon-like history of Draper
illustrates, 129 however, the Court's opinions are susceptible to
various readings. With Spinelli's obvious and logical analytical
framework now rejected, "Murphy's Law,"' 30 a force dreaded by
33
Judge Moylan, 13' Professor LaFave,'3 2 and the Court alike,
will operate with a greater vengeance than ever.
Under the Spinelli prongs, a police officer knew what questions to ask an informant, and how to formulate an affidavit in
support of an application for a warrant. 34 Under Gates, a new
process of trial and error may begin, as magistrates attempt to
work with the new totality analysis. It may be expected that

128. Id. at 2327.
129. See supra notes 46 and 115.
130. Murphy's Law states that "what can go wrong, will go wrong."
131. Stanley, 19 Md. App. at 528, 313 A.2d at 860; Moylan, supra note 22, at 786.
132. LaFave, supra note 34, at 2.
133. 103 S. Ct. at 2327 n.4.
134. One commentator has suggested that, if anything, it has been too easy to operate
under Spinelli. Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search Warrants
and the Possibilityof Police Perjury,1971 U. ILL L.F. 405 (1971).
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most law enforcement officers will attempt to play it safe, and
meet the two-prong test whenever possible in preparing affidavits containing informants' tips. Magistrates and lower courts,
too, can be expected to apply Spinelli when possible, to guarantee a warrant's validity, and only fall back upon Gates when a
tip cannot pass Spinelli's more stringent requirements. Thus, the
two prongs may continue to "rule from the grave." If this prediction is borne out, then the Gates decision may come to be
regarded for what it is: a compromise of common sense, permit135
ted in the name of more effective law enforcement.
Criticism of Gates is warranted on the basis of its being a
needless exception to stare decisis and a departure from the
common sense that even lay jurors instinctively exercise. Aguilar may have announced the two prongs, but it did not create
them. The two part inquiry does not exist by virtue of judicial
fiat, but rather flows ineluctably from the inferential structure of
hearsay itself. By the same token, by rejecting the two-prong
approach, the Gates Court could not destroy it. The logic of Aguilar and Spinelli will come back to haunt the Court until it is in
some guise reinstated.
CONCLUSION
In Illinois v. Gates, a bare majority of the Supreme Court
abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli two-prong test for a new "totality of the circumstances analysis." Aguilar and Spinelli had
viewed the two prongs as analytically severable, independent
criteria, each of which must be satisifed by every informant's tip.
Under Gates, the two questions have become merely closely
intertwined issues, such that an unsatisfactory showing as to
one may be compensated for by a strong showing as to the other.
The difference in the two approaches is more than semantic; it
goes to the heart of the intuitive process of the finder of fact.
Prior to Gates, the lower courts were finally beginning to
develop a coherent, workable conceptual structure for dealing
with informants' tips in a probable cause context. The Gates
decision, however, put these efforts to naught, and turned back
the clock by at least two decades. One might expect, then, to find
powerful reasons. motivating the Rehnquist opinion. This note

135.

See 103 S. Ct. at 2351-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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offers no answers to the question of why the majority took the
position that it did. Rather, it has attempted to demonstrate that
two of the most likely explanations, logic and necessity, may be
eliminated. Although the new "totality" test was ostensibly introduced in the name of common sense, ironically it actually runs
against the grain of the fact finder's intuitive process. Furthermore, if the Court had wished to illustrate that the exigencies of
effective law enforcement justified abandoning Spinelli and its
progeny, it picked the wrong case. The Gates search warrant
arguably could have survived the old two-prong test. Whatever
the actual motivations for the Gates decision may be, they cannot be discovered in either the facts or the logic of the decision
itself.
As magistrates and law enforcement officials labor to apply
Illinois v. Gates in the years ahead, they will find themselves
more hampered than helped by the "totality" test. They can be
expected to fall back on the dependable analysis in Aguilar and
Spinelli as the ultimate criterion for probable cause. The twoprong test, discredited in the highest Court of the land, will be
vindicated in daily practice by the common sense of laymen and
laywomen closest to the facts.
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